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Abstract - A model of a double auction market of zero-
intelligence traders was replicated as an agent-based model 
using the same market supply and demand curves. The orig-
inal results were reproduced, and these results and other 
behavior of the model were examined under different 
schemes of agent activation, both exogenous and endoge-
nous. While the qualitative differences were typically minor, 
there were statistically significant differences in all the 
measures of all the markets in the original research and im-
portant divergence in the extended evolution of the simula-
tion. These differences have important implications for all 
follow-on replications of a zero-intelligence trading model, 
and for the replication process in general.  
Keywords: agent-based simulation, activation, updating, 
model replication, standardization, market design, zero-
intelligence traders. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
N the construction of agent-based simulations, there are 
a number of important design decisions that must be 
made, either explicitly or implicitly. Among these are 
model size, the presence and topology of networks among 
the agents, and the sequence of activation events in which 
agent-objects execute their methods. If the process of rep-
licating results is to become more common, the specifica-
tion of models in the research literature needs be suffi-
ciently complete so that the same conceptual model can 
be instantiated by separate researchers using different 
code and, perhaps, a different language.  
The determination of this sufficiency is an active area 
of research. Specifically, we examine the question of 
whether varying the activation scheme will result in dif-
ferent outcome behavior. It is most important to determine 
if these differences are so significant that they would af-
fect the quality and success of the replication process.  
It has been long recognized that activation can make a 
difference in social simulations [1], [2]. A number of re-
cent examinations into activation for various published or 
suggested models have been reported [3], [4]. Collective-
ly, this literature should motivate the examination of the  
impact of model design on a broad range of influential 
agent-based simulations. Unfortunately, the literature of 
such examinations is sparse.  
We have chosen to re-evaluate an influential finance 
model – the Zero-Intelligence Trader model first pub-
lished by Gode and Sunder [5]– under different activation 
designs to help explore the question of the importance of 
activation.  
Finance is an area of high activity for complexity sci-
ence and agent-based models. It was one of the primary 
motivations behind the founding of the Santa Fe Institute 
[6]. Agent-based models, with their many independent 
decision-makers, are excellent surrogates for traders in a 
securities market. Agents can be infused with a number of 
different strategies, and global information can be made 
available either market-wide or differentially to only se-
lect traders.  
One of the simplest market models is the "zero-
intelligence trader" or ZIT model. Pairs of traders are cho-
sen from a population of traders. In the most straightfor-
ward ZIT models, traders trade a single commodity. They 
cannot access market-wide parameters such as the last 
trade price or the trade price history or even the details of 
their counterparty’s financial position. The traders are not 
completely devoid of knowledge: the sellers know their 
own cost of acquisition, and the buyers know what future 
price at which they can expect to liquidate the asset. (The 
latter might seem a bit artificial, but is analogous to the 
book value of assets or the surrender value of a bond.) 
The simplicity of the ZIT model invites excursions on 
model format and design, such as studying the impact of 
activation.   
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The most referenced ZIT model was introduced by 
Gode and Sunder [5] in an article entitled “Allocative 
Efficiency of Markets with Zero-Intelligence Traders: 
Market as a Partial Substitute for Individual Rationality.” 
Nearly 1200 scholarly articles referred back to Gode and 
Sunder over the past two decades. Researchers were ini-
tially investigating whether a rule-based double auction 
market simulation would show the same market success 
as an experimental market of actual individuals. Gode and 
Sunder defined success in terms of “allocative efficiency” 
(the even distribution of wealth) and the market would 
approach the theoretical maximum profit over the course 
of the simulation. They used graduate students incentiv-
ized by academic grade credits in an experiment to repli-
cate profit-motivated traders. They then simulated two 
double auction markets to compare with the real-world 
experiment. A wide body of research extends the ZIT 
model [7], but none appear to evaluate activation. 
I. BOUNDED ZIT MODEL DESCRIPTION 
Both computer simulations began with a small number 
of traders: six buyers and six sellers. Traders trade one 
‘share’ at a time. One simulation was unbounded, with the 
buyers and sellers making offers randomly selected be-
tween 0 and 200. The more rational simulation was 
termed a ‘bounded’ or constrained simulation. The buyers 
have a ‘supply’ curve in which the cost for their next 
share to be sold is determined by an escalating price 
curve. The sellers likewise have a redemption price, at 
which they may liquidate any item they buy. This re-
demption price curve decreases depending upon how 
many shares the buyers have already. After each trade, 
buyers and sellers calculate their profit. Buyers subtract 
the cost from the trade price, and sellers subtract the trade 
price from the redemption price. Buyers and sellers are 
bounded in that they are not allowed to make an offer that 
would lose money.  
Gode and Sunder made a three simplifications to a 
double auction model: 
 Only one unit was traded at a time.  
 Once a trade took place, all outstanding offers were 
canceled. 
 If bid and ask offers crossed (seller asked less than the 
best buyer bid or vice versa), the price was set by that 
of the earliest offer. 
Buyers are informed ‘privately’ of the redemption val-
ue of each share. This value, vi, depends on the number of 
shares the individual buyer has already bought. The buyer 
knows his own demand curve, but the market demand 
curve is not available to any trader. Similarly, sellers are 
endowed with a supply curve that represents the cost, ci, 
of the i
th
 unit sold. This supply curve applies to each indi-
vidual seller and the market supply curve is also not 
known to any trader. Each trade, therefore, created a prof-
it. For the seller the profit is the net of the price and the 
cost, i
p c
. Similarly, the buyer’s profit is the net of the 
redemption value and the price, i
v p
. Buyers and sellers 
form offers at a rate and in a sequence determined by the 
activation scheme. All buyers have the same individual 
demand curve, and all sellers have the same individual 
supply curve. The offer for buyers is a random value be-
tween 0 and their current redemption value, vi. The offer 
for sellers is a random value between their cost, ci, and 
200. This is what was meant by the bounded market. The 
unbounded market was also examined, but that is not con-
sidered here. (Nor is the experiment using graduate stu-
dents.)  
Figure 1. Market 1 Trade Price vs. Trade Number and  vs. Turn 
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Gode and Sunder conducted six runs of the bounded 
market, with all values reset at the beginning of each run. 
The runs were terminated after 30 seconds. They exam-
ined five markets, or five sets of supply and demand 
curves. These curves were described in market-by-market 
graphs beside the trade price series. For the first four mar-
kets it was possible to estimate these values by inspection, 
but the fifth market had supply and demand curves with 
too fine a structure to reliably estimate. Only markets one 
through four were replicated here.   
II. MODEL REPLICATION 
Working in Python, we were able to create a double-
auction model in which the traders behave in the manner 
described in the source article. In order to perform diag-
nostics it was necessary to impose some structure on the 
dynamic processes of the model. We introduced the con-
cept of a turn, which we define lasting as long as one full 
population of traders have generated offers. A turn, there-
fore, is driven by events and not by computing time. This 
deviates somewhat from the source article, but allows 
side-by-side comparison of a variety of activation 
schemes (see below).  
Once the turn in which trades take place is recorded, a 
price series of trades can be observed in market time in-
stead of trade time. The Gode and Sunder paper plotted 
trade price per (ordinal) trade number. Thus, they did not 
observe the fact that later trades occurred much later in a 
run, after many, many offers had been made. See Figure 1 
for a depiction of this dynamic behavior for Market 1. 
Figure 1 also shows a number of other aspects of our 
market model. Instead of stopping after 30 seconds of 
execution, we have chosen to stop after a constant number 
of turns. For this graphic, we chose 600 turns, but in the 
full experiments we ran the market out to 5000. Even with 
5000 runs there still appear to be trades taking place. That 
is, even after many turns and many offers are generated 
there is still one buyer or seller who has redemption or 
cost set just above or below the market-clearing price.  
Figure 2 shows a market with the asymmetry in the op-
posite direction – a steeper demand curve and a shallower 
supply curve. In both cases the trades approach the market 
clearing price from the direction of the steepest curve. In 
Market 1, they approach from below because the supply 
curve is steeper. In Markets 2 and 3, trades arrive at the 
market clearing price from above because the demand 
curve is steeper.  
Gode and Sunder were investigating how much of the 
rationality associated with human traders could be at-
tributed to human decision-making motivated by profit 
and intelligence and how much is due to simple market 
discipline – the requirement that a seller can’t sell below 
cost and a buyer can’t buy above redemption value. While 
the bounded market’s appears to be in between the ran-
dom and the human market (by inspection), and the 
bounded market appears to converge to the same equilib-
rium price as the human market (determined by a regres-
sion of the bounded market curves, averaged over five 
runs), Gode and Sunder measured the outcome with two 
quantitative measures: market efficiency and wealth dis-
tribution.  
In the market evolution figures the supply and demand 
curves for each market was determined from the reference 
paper, but the price time series results were from our own 
replication of this double-auction model coded in Python.  
III. ALTERNATIVE ACTIVATION SCHEMES 
In replicating this model, it was possible to postulate a 
broad spectrum of different activation schemes, but not 
all. There does not appear to be an elegant method to im-
plement synchronous activation, in which agents’ future 
states are stored as all agents decide, followed by simulta-
neous state-change. Thus, only asynchronous activation 
was implemented. 
Figure 2. Market 2 Trade Price vs. Trade and vs. Turn 
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A. Random Activation 
There are several suggestions in the original paper that the 
authors chose asynchronous random activation. Activa-
tion was just demonstrated to be important in the same 
year (1992) [2], [8], so it is not unexpected that Gode and 
Sunder would not consider elaborating on the issue.  
In our instantiation, random activation merely means 
that traders are chosen at random from the set of all trad-
ers. These traders form an offer. A turn is defined as com-
plete when a number of traders equal to the total number 
of traders has made an offer. No data points are collected 
at the end of one turn, and no values (other than turn 
number) are reset. All offers to sell or buy that are in ef-
fect at the end of a turn continue in force at the beginning 
of the next turn. Once a trade takes place, all other offers 
are canceled. 
Initialization and reinitialization:  On the first activa-
tion, and every time the offers have been canceled, the 
first trader’s offer will establish the new “best offer” of 
that type. Thus, if a seller is chosen first, he will propose a 
sell price that is a uniform random variable between his 
cost (for this item in his inventory sequence) and the max-
imum of 120. A buyer will, likewise, establish the new 
“best buy” offer between zero and his redemption value. 
Trading can commence as early as the second offer.  
B. Uniform Activation 
Asynchronous uniform activation is executed in a man-
ner similar to random activation. At the beginning of each 
turn, the array of traders is shuffled. In one turn of uni-
form activation, all traders will be activated. Otherwise, 
the trade rules are the same: offers are carried over from 
turn to turn, but are canceled once a trade is complete. 
Initialization and reinitialization are conducted in the 
same manner.  
The trade timing plots for market 3 are shown for the 
uniform activation scheme. There does not appear to be 
any significant difference in trade timing behavior be-
tween random and uniform.  
C. Poisson Activation 
Poisson activation is a process in which agents are acti-
vated according to an exponential distribution with an 
arrival rate, λA. This will mean that activations for any 
given agent are a Poisson process. In its simplest form, a 
Poisson activation scheme would have all agents activated 
with the same λ. This, however, would merely replicate 
the random selection method so we explore only the case 
of heterogeneous values for λA.  
Poisson activation differs from other asynchronous 
methods in that this variation among the agents can be 
based on the state of each agent or some internal parame-
ter value. This is known as endogenous activation, and 
has been the subject of several recent studies [4], [9]. For 
our explorations, we chose agent wealth, which was cal-
culated at the beginning of each turn. Thus, agent activa-
tion rates are made proportional to agent wealth values. In 
order to investigate the ‘leveling’ nature of these comput-
er-based trading markets – a key question for the original 
researchers – we chose to make activation rates propor-
tional to the absolute distance between the agent’s wealth 
and the average wealth of the population of agents. In that 
way, agents that are at the extremes (rich or poor) will 
likely trade more often. 
In order to make appropriate comparisons between 
Poisson activation and other activation methods, it is nec-
essary to re-normalize all of the values of λA so that, on 
average, each turn there will be one full population of 
traders’ activations. we accomplish this by building acti-
vation time for each agent and adding it to an ‘event list’. 
Trader-agent activation times are drawn sequentially from 
an exponential distribution and each added to the previous 
until the times exceed 1.0. These times are then all sorted 
and the trader agent sequence that results from that is 
passed to the program as a list of activations. Offer-
making proceeds in accordance with this list for a given 
turn. At the beginning of the next turn the values of λA are 
again calculated and another sequence is generated. The 
order of each turn’s sequence is dependent on the current 
values of trader wealth and on a random draw.  
Figure 3. Market 3 (Uniform) Trade Price vs. Trade  and vs. Turn 
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This process works well once the model is established, 
but at the beginning of the model no trades have taken 
place and, thus, traders have no wealth. In these cases the 
values of λA are merely assigned randomly (and normal-
ized as above). Once one trader has acquired some wealth 
the process can proceed as designed.  
The Poisson process takes advantage of the 
‘memoryless’ feature of the underlying exponential distri-
bution. Thus, for every trader at the beginning of each 
turn can treat the ‘wait time’ as starting anew. It does not 
matter, given the waiting time is exponentially distributed, 
how long each trader has been waiting since the last acti-
vation.  
D. Inverse Poisson Activation 
The process of activating agents faster if they are fur-
ther from the average has an interesting counterpart: acti-
vation rates that favor proximity to the average. Thus, we 
examined a λ–setting process that slows down agent acti-
vations when the trader wealth is farther from the mean 
wealth. This inverse Poisson activation rate is the fourth 
activation scheme to be examined in the four markets.  
It is important to note that the two Poisson schemes 
represent a conceptual departure from the other two asyn-
chronous schemes. Both of these represent the relatively 
new concept of endogenous activation. At least one article 
[4] has found that this can show differences in outcome 
behavior when compared with the more normal exoge-
nous activation.  
IV. OUTCOME BEHAVIOR METRICS 
Gode and Sunder do not rely heavily on precise quanti-
fication of the market results. This is consistent with their 
goal of measuring the performance of an automated mar-
ket against that of a human market. They are trying to 
determine how much market efficiency (in profit creation 
and distribution) is due to the constraints of profit and loss 
rules and how much is due to human trading. Thus, they 
take the unconstrained automated market and the human 
market as two extremes and see where the bounded ZIT 
market falls. They judge that it falls much closer to the 
human market, but this is generally a qualitative judg-
ment.  
We chose to measure three aspects of the constrained 
ZIT market: its efficiency in generating wealth (or prof-
its), its effectiveness in evenly allocating wealth among 
the traders, and the time it takes to reach equilibrium. 
Gode and Sunder used the first two measures in their pa-
per, but left the third unexamined.  
A. Wealth Generation 
It is a straightforward matter to measure total wealth at 
the end of a run. One of the key (and unstated) influences 
on this total is the length of a run. Gode and Sunder ran a 
trading ‘day’ for 30 seconds. In our runs, we made use of 
the turn structure to better standardize the runs, choosing 
5000 turns as a standard run.  
The total wealth in the market is compared with the to-
tal theoretical wealth. Smith’s definition of market effi-
ciency was used [10]. Thus, the allocative efficiency of a 
market is the total profits earned in one run (added across 
all traders at the end of the run) divided by the maximum 
profits available. Actual human markets quickly converge 
to 99% efficiency. Markets only vary from this, the au-
thors noted in 1992, when typographic errors in market 
orders create a distortion in the price time series. (Consid-
ering the events of the past two decades, the Gode and 
Sunder paper could be seen as an important early warning 
of such market ‘errors’.) 
B. Profit Allocation  
The second metric chosen by Gode and Sunder was the 
profit allocation among the traders. To determine this, 
they calculated the cross-sectional root mean squared dif-
ference between the actual and the equilibrium profits 
across the traders. They defined the value ai as the profits 
(or total wealth) acquired by trader i. They also calculated 
Figure 4. Market 4 (Poisson) Trade Price vs. Trade and vs. Turn 
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the theoretical profits for this trader as πi. Thus, the dis-






  (1) 
They left unstated how they calculated the equilibrium 
values. We divided equilibrium profits into those for buy-
ers and those for sellers. We assumed buyers’ equilibrium 
profits as the profits they could earn if they traded all the 
shares they could at the market clearing price. This, of 
course, would only include those shares with a redemp-
tion value above the market clearing price. Similarly, the 
sellers values of πi was determined as the profits a seller 
would earn if all those shares held with costs below the 
market clearing price were sold at the market clearing 
price. Thus, to calculate D, it is necessary to separate the 
calculation of the sum into two parts. More correctly, it 
should be: 
   
2 21
s s b bs b
D a a
n
       
  (2) 
Where s = seller s ∈ S and b = buyer b ∈ B and n = the 
total number of traders. This separation is necessary be-
cause the supply and demand curves are not symmetrical. 
Sellers’ equilibrium profits differ from those of buyers in 
essentially all markets.  
C. Time to Last Trade 
Gode and Sunder did not examine the model behavior 
over the long term for a variety of reasons. They were 
comparing simulated markets with actual human experi-
ments. The human experiments had a finite duration be-
cause they were limited by many factors that are not pre-
sent in simulations. Thus, the simulated markets were 
truncated and the long-term data are missing (or, in the 
terminology of statistics, the data were ‘censored’).  
We expected to run the markets to exhaustion. That is, 
we experimented with a number of lengths of runs in the 
random and uniform activation types to find a reasonable 
point at which trading ended. We chose a run length of 
5000 turns, believing this would encompass all trades for 
all markets and all activations. As noted in the result sec-
tion, there was still censored data even at these extended 
runs. In fact, this represents a major difference among the 
activation schemes. Thus, while we didn’t collect a com-
prehensive set of data, analysis of the turn at which the 
‘last trade’ took place certainly achieved one of the key 
goals of this project – differentiating among activation 
schemes.  
V. MODEL RESULTS 
A full spectrum of experiments was run: four activation 
schemes across four markets. Each experiment consisted 
Figure 5. Total Wealth (All Traders) After 5000 Turns – Variable Scale 
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of 2000 runs of the market and activation, with each run 
extended to 5000 turns. At the end of each run, total 
wealth, wealth dispersion, and the turn of the last trade 
were recorded.  
Market analysis shows that the exogenous activation 
schemes run to completion and the endogenous schemes 
(the Poisson activation types) still have some trading op-
portunities available at the end of 5000 turns. This is most 
apparent in the Last Turn measurements in Figure 7.  
Figure 5 shows the four histograms of total wealth for 
all markets. The inverse Poisson activation exhibits ex-
treme values of low wealth, but actually bunches much of 
the wealth closer to the maximum value for each market.  
 
Table I. Mean Total Wealth at End of  Run (2000 Runs) 
 
 
With 2000 runs, it is possible to test the hypothesis that 
these means are drawn from different populations against 
the null hypothesis that the variation is simply due to ran-
dom errors (and that the random errors are normally dis-
tributed).  
With four activation schemes there would be sixteen 
pairwise comparisons. It is not necessary to examine these 
exhaustively to see differences among the activation 
types. As Table II shows, most of these comparisons are 
highly significant. Even the random-uniform comparisons 
– the closest averages for all the markets – allow the re-
jection of the null hypothesis for markets 2 and 4. Note 
that values that are too small to calculate are reported as 
 
 
Table II. p-values for Total Wealth Pairwise Comparisons 
 
Average Total Wealth Market 
Activation 1 2 3 4 
Random 899.0 1016.6 791.6 1497.7 
Uniform 899.2 1017.2 791.7 1498.2 
Poisson 892.2 1003.2 785.4 1480.5 
Inverse 
Poisson 
881.3 999.6 785.1 1488.8 
Max Wealth 900 1020 792 1500 
p-values Market   
 Comparison 1 2 3 4  
 Random  - 
Uniform 
0.021 <0.001 0.035 <0.001 
 Random - 
Poisson 
<0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
 Random – 
Inverse Pois-
son 
<0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
 Poisson - 
Inverse Pois-
son 
<0.001 <0.001 0.525 <0.001 
Figure 6. Wealth Dispersal, Market 3 (Constant Scale) 
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zero. (While the averages are close, the power of the test 
is derived from the n = 4000 combined data points for the 
pair.)  
Gode and Sunder compared the total wealth in the sim-
ulated markets to the maximum total wealth possible. This 
maximum is shown on the final row of the wealth table 
for each of the four markets. Their objective was to com-
pare how close the simulation came to maximum wealth 
with the proximity of the human markets. They deemed 
that their simulations across the four markets achieved 
essentially the same results as the human market, with 
efficiency percentages between 96 and 98%. These results 
were replicated in all markets by all activation types. The 
lowest percentage was 97.9% in the case of the inverse 
Poisson in Market 1.  
Similar analysis can be conducted on the much more 
bell-shaped wealth dispersion. Wealth dispersion is de-
picted on the histograms on Figure 6. These have all been 
adjusted so that they appear on the same x- and y-axis 
scales, which we designate with a white background. 
 
Table III. Mean Wealth Dispersion Over 2000 Runs 
 
 Table IV. p-values for Mean Wealth Dispersion in Pairwise 
Comparisons 
With the scales adjusted, it’s clear that the histograms 
appear significantly different. The Poisson activation his-
togram shows a significantly larger tail than the others. 
This may not be apparent from the small size of the bars 
on the far right hand side of that plot, but the automatic 
adjustment of the graphing program clearly adjusts for 
larger bins for the Poisson case to accommodate the larger 
range of data.  
While the wealth dispersion appeared to vary little 
across the runs, the large number of runs allowed us to 
determine that many of these differences were statistically 
significant. Using similar calculations to the averages of 
the wealth, we can develop another table of p-values.  
Table IV shows that somewhat fewer of the pairings show 
differences that are significant. Market 3 shows some 
interesting behavior in that even the random – uniform 
comparison results in a difference that is significant at the 
99% confidence level. Still, we reject the null hypothesis 
that the differences between these sample means is a 
product of random fluctuations in seven of the 16 cases 
p-values Market  
Comparison 1 2 3 4 
Random  - Uniform 0.23 0.20 0.002 0.36 
Random - Poisson <.001 0.278 <.001 <.001 
Random –  
Inverse Poisson 
0.14 0.28 <.001 0.457 
Poisson -  
Inverse Poisson 
<.001 0.59 0.67 <.001 
Average Wealth Dispersion Market 
Activation 1 2 3 4 
Random 29.2 51.2 54.9 110.3 
Uniform 28.8 50.5 53.2 111.0 
Poisson 31.6 51.9 57.0 102.9 
Inverse  
Poisson 
28.7 51.8 56.8 110.9 
Figure 7. Last Trades in 5000 Turns (Variable Scale) 
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examined. Activation type makes a difference, at least 
statistically. 
In addition to the odd shape of the Poisson activation 
histogram, it’s also clear that the inverse Poisson activa-
tion type has a much tighter bunch of averages. The 
means between the two are quite similar (57 and 56.8), 
but the standard deviation is substantially larger for the 
Poisson activation scheme.  
Finally, we analyzed the evolution these markets and 
activation schemes over the long term. Gode and Sunder 
did not consider the dynamics of their simulation during 
extended runs because they were comparing them with 
human traders in finite-time markets. We recorded the 
turn at which the last trade took place before the end of 
run and use this as a metric for market closure. In evaluat-
ing the results, it appears that 5000 turns was more than 
adequate for the random and uniform activation methods, 
but that Poisson and inverse Poisson were still exhibiting 
trading behavior late during a 5000-turn run (!). 
Figure 7 shows the behavior of all four last trades for 
the four activation schemes. Clearly, for all markets, the 
extent of the trading varies substantially as the activation 
type is changed. Not only are the histograms of somewhat 
different shape, the Poisson and inverse Poisson clearly 
have censored trading activity.  
This phenomenon would affect analysis of any ZIT 
models, especially if trading were cut off after a few hun-
dred turns. It is uncertain where Gode and Sunder stopped 
trading. They set their cutoff at 30 seconds of computer 
time, which itself might be a different measure for endog-
enous than for exogenous activation. In executing our 
simulations, the random and uniform experiments take 
about half the time as the two Poisson activation experi-
ments.  
Table V shows a full factorial analysis of the actual 
values of the mean. The sizeable difference can be ob-
served by inspection, but a complete analysis of the p-
values confirms the statistical significance of the result. 
There is no pairing that has a p-value larger than    
     . Thus, it can be concluded that activation makes a 





Table V. Mean Last-Turn Over 2000 Runs 
 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
There are several motivations behind the question: 
Does activation change the outcome of agent-based mod-
els? Our simulation appears to answer different aspects of 
this question in different ways.  
 
For the simple issue of statistical results, the analysis 
shows that for all three metrics (total wealth, wealth dis-
persion, and the last-trade parameter), there are statistical-
ly significant differences between at least some of the 
activation schemes, and for one metric there are signifi-
cant differences among all of them.  
We chose a ‘real world’ model – as opposed to a model 
of abstract agents engaged in mathematical game theory – 
to observe the impact of activation differences on policy 
recommendations. Gode and Sunder wanted to determine 
whether markets are made efficient by structural features 
(such as the requirement to make profitable trades) or by 
the rational decisions of human traders. They determined, 
using qualitative (but quite reasonable) analysis, that the 
constrained ZIT simulation essentially replicated the effi-
ciency of the human traders in achieving the total theoret-
ical wealth. They also concluded that simulated traders 
distributed the wealth close to -- but a little more than -- 
the human traders, at least in the early stages of trading. 
After a time, the human traders dispersed their profits 
more evenly, but this was undoubtedly due to the memory 
effect. Simulated traders forgot their supply and demand 
curves at the beginning of each experiment.  
Would Gode and Sunder’s conclusions have been dif-
ferent if they used different activation schemes? Probably 
not: 
 All activation schemes and all markets ended with a 
total wealth that was between 97.92 and 99.96% of 
maximum wealth.  
 Profit dispersion has a somewhat higher variance for 
the endogenous activation patterns, so it is possible 
that, given that they only did six runs, the authors 
might have generated outlier results. If they increased 
the number of runs, however, they would have returned 
to their original conclusion (simulated ZIT traders pro-
duce slightly larger dispersion, but far closer to human 
traders than unconstrained trading).  
Gode and Sunder did not examine the question of mod-
el convergence or trade evolution. Thus, they would not 
have noticed the significant differences that appear in the 
last-trade statistics among the different activation 
schemes. 
A third motivation for evaluating the importance of ac-
tivation schemes is to establish a proper standard for re-
search in which the agent-based models of one scientific 
team are replicated by subsequent researchers. The Gode 
and Sunder article was chosen because it appeared as a 
reference in 1171 subsequent articles. Clearly, many other 
Mean Turn of Last Trade 
5000- Turn Experiment 
Market  
Activation 1 2 3 4 
Random 1377.2  503.5  415.1  270.0 
Uniform 1273.4  438.3  357.6  234.2 
Poisson 1919.3 1718.9  947.4 1300.1 
Inverse 
Poisson 
2124.9 1927.7 2240.6 1695.1 
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researchers are at least working with the concept of simu-
lating markets, and many are actually building agent-
based models using the zero-intelligence trading para-
digm. (None of those 1171 use the words “updating” or 
“activation” – or their derivatives – in the title, so activa-
tion is not a major research focus in this domain.)  In the 
research reported above, the differential results from last 
trade analysis alone (if not all the results) show that if a 
replication of ZIT model is expanded beyond the work of 
Gode and Sunder, the results must be shown to be robust 
over different activation schemes. Thus, if agent-based 
researchers are to meet the standard of other sciences and 
work on replicating one another’s experimental results, 
then reports of their results must include the activation 
scheme used in the model.  
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